Economic Drivers of the International Rhino Horn Trade

Abstract

The international rhino horn trade persists through the interaction of consumer demand, illicit profits, criminal networks and uneven conservation capacity. This critical narrative review examines how these forces shape incentives across source, transit and consumer markets. Drawing on published research and institutional reports, it brings together evidence on medicinal beliefs, status consumption and investment demand; the role of trust and security coordination in illegal transactions; corruption; dehorning; and proposals for regulated legal supply. The literature indicates that price alone cannot explain the trade's resilience. Trafficking networks manage enforcement risk through relationships and access, while differences in protection create opportunities for displacement. Dehorning can reduce the immediate reward from poaching, but residual horn, regrowth and continuing demand limit its effectiveness as a stand-alone response. Proposals to legalise trade remain contested because their effects depend on consumer preferences, substitution between legal and illegal horn, supply capacity and the ability to prevent laundering. The review develops an integrated risk-reward framework linking market incentives to governance and conservation outcomes. It argues for coordinated responses that combine demand reduction, targeted enforcement, anti-corruption safeguards, sustained conservation finance and locally appropriate protection measures. It also identifies priorities for evaluating intervention costs, unintended displacement and long-term population outcomes. The analysis is a qualitative synthesis, not a new empirical test or meta-analysis.